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Introduction
It is generally believed that somewhere in the brain is an internal representation of the
outside world that allows us to experience the world around us. The sense modalities take in
information about the outside world, and our brains update our internal representation of the
world in an attempt to keep us up to date about the world around us. One aspect of our
account of the outside world that is of particularly intense debate is that of color ontology. An
internal representation of the outside world, is supposedly, built up based on sensory data from
our various sense modalities and therefore color would seem to be produced, through some
neural mechanism, in our heads. On this view, sense information and its subsequent nervous
influx cannot be defined in a way that closes certain explanatory gaps in color perception.
In opposition to the idea of neural mechanisms manufacturing color in the head is the
sensorimotor approach to color vision, elaborated on by O’Regan and Noë in the paper 
A
sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
. The idea of needing an internal
representation of the world is rejected on this view, and it describes color as being an objective
constituent of the world and our perception of color as being dependent on our interactions
with the environment. Color, on this view, is a law that describes the way surfaces change the
spectrum of the incoming light, and color experience is summarized by understanding the color
of an object as the way its appearance varies given relevant circumstances, and vision is a type
of exploratory activity in which we actively explore our world using our acquired mastery of
so-called “sensorimotor contingencies” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001). That is to say, that according
to sensorimotor theory we know a sheet of paper is red because of the way it appears to be red
under the light, and we know this because we apprehend its red quality by exercising our
implicit knowledge of the particular contingent sensorimotor laws that apply to visual
apprehension. We look at the red sheet of paper, move it from bright light to shadow, view it
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from different angles until we understand the color that best fits (O’Regan, 2010). As we
become more skillful in our tacit understanding of the sensorimotor contingencies (sometimes
also described as sensorimotor dependencies) the easier our apprehension of color becomes.
The Sensorimotor theory of color presented by O’Regan in his research subsequent to 
A
sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
, argues that color exists objectively in
the external world and his theory of how we process color (what he terms the “biological
reflectance function”) substantiates this claim through anthropological corroboration in the
form of color naming tendencies among the various languages and cultures of the world.
O’Regan’s argument seems to hinge on the idea that certain color hues are more basic, or in his
terminology “simpler,” than other colors, and that given this simplicity these colors may be
biologically more distinguishable than other colors, and therefore cultures may be more likely to
attach a color name to that particular hue (Philipona and O’Regan, 2006). On this view, there is
no explanatory gap standing between color experience and understanding the nature of color
(O’Regan, 2010). According to the sensorimotor approach to consciousness the brain does not
generate sensation, as sensations are not the kind of things that can be generated (O’Regan,
“Why the Approach Is Not a Denial of the Brain”). Color is simply the way an illuminant changes
the surface of an object, and color experience is our understanding of that surface change given
our mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies involved in vision. Colors are understood as
ontologically objective, and independent of the mind. As such, far from being unexplainable, on
this view, our so-called qualia experience can be best explained as our skill with, and access to,
sensorimotor contingencies.
In this paper I will argue against Kevin O’Regan’s claim that the biologically restricted
reflectance function (variously referred to in this paper as the “biological reflectance function”)
and its notion of “simple” colors naturally lead to a biologically consistent standard for species
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wide color naming. Although the simplicity of these colors may allow for easier apprehension,
the notion that color simplicity will naturally lead to a consistent standard for the naming of
basic color hues across a species is inconsistent with the idea of objective colors in the way
that he portrays it. While it fixes many of the traditional explanatory issues surrounding color
perception, it opens up new explanatory issues surrounding color. In response to this I will
argue that more emphasis must be put on the place of socio/cultural judgements and habits in
the sensorimotor approach to color perception. In contrast to O’Regans assertion that culture
follows natural tendencies to name certain colors, I argue that color naming follows
socio-cultural considerations for color naming regardless of objectivity of color experience.

A comment on Enactivism and the Sensorimotor Approach
While both O’Regan and and Noë collaborated on what Kevin O’Regan refers to as his
“magnum opus,” namely the paper 
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
,
since that time both have directed their work down different paths. Noë’s focus since then has
primarily been on strengthening the case for the “paradigm shift” towards enactivism (Kyselo,
2015). O’Regan’s work on the other hand has primarily been focused on fleshing out the details
of the sensorimotor approach. While enactivism and sensorimotor theory have, for many,
become synonymous, it should be noted that there are differences. Enactivism considers
consciousness an emergent phenomenon constituted of dynamic patterns of interaction
between organism and its environment (Hutto, 2011). The sensorimotor approach is a theory of
perceptual consciousness and is not a necessary constituent of an enactivist approach to
consciousness, as in autopoietic enactivism (Scholarpedia, 2015). Only recently has O’Regan
began describing the sensorimotor approach (sensorimotor enactivism) as a form of enactivism,
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one that emphasizes perceptual abilities, as opposed to, say, autopoietic enactivism which
stresses autopoietic capacities and background processes (Degenaar and O’Regan, 2015).
For the purposes of this paper I will refer to O’Regan’s work on the sensorimotor theory
alone, and where reference is made to A
sensorimotor account of vision and visual
consciousness
, it is in the context of O'Regan's subsequent sensorimotor theory. That is to say
that I am not emphasizing the greater enactivist paradigm, unless directly stated, but restrict
my paper to that of O’Regan’s sensorimotor theory of visual consciousness, specifically that of
its color ontology.

A Biological Approach to Color
In the 2006 paper, 
Color naming, unique hues, and hue cancellation predicted from
singularities in reflection properties
, Philipona and O’Regan describe a reflectance function of a
surface, what physicists use to define the reflectance of a surface, that has been “biologically”
restricted by the nature of our visual apparatus (Philipona and O’Regan, 2006). For the purposes
of this paper, I term this biologically restricted reflectance function as the b
iological reflectance
function
. The biological reflectance function describes surface reflectance in terms of how the
wavelengths of light are processed by the three cone types the human visual apparatus
possesses.
By analyzing this biological reflectance function, O’Regan argues that the color profile of
any surface can be characterized by nine numbers which can be converted into a 3x3 matrix R
and analyzed into a singularity index. In comparing this singularity index to anthropological
studies of color naming across cultures a striking similarity is discovered. This similarity led
O’Regan to postulate that color naming and color apprehension must be a biological
consequence of the extreme singularity of certain color hues. The “simpler” and more singular
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the color, as listed on O’Regan’s singularity index, the more likely it is to acquire a name and
become one of the “basic” colors of a culture’s color system.

Sensorimotor approach to Color
The sensorimotor approach to color is best broken into two parts; the nature of color,
and the experience of color through the exercise of sensorimotor contingencies. While the two
parts are best explained separately, for reasons I will explain later, both the nature of color and
the experience of it are sufficiently similar as to be functionally the same. The difference being
that experience is restricted to the abilities of the human visual apparatus, and is dependent on
our apprehension of color. The nature of the color of an object is a law that describes the way
surfaces change the spectrum of the incoming light. That is to say, the ways in which the light
(illuminant) changes the appearance of the object (reflectant). While the surface being viewed is
changing the spectrum of the incoming light, it is the interaction between the incoming light
and the surface that is contributing to the appearance of the surface. According to this view, a
white piece of paper can appear green under green light, or yellow under yellow light. This
interaction between the white sheet of paper and the varying color of illuminating lights is
exactly what makes the paper a white sheet of paper, the fact that when under yellow light, the
sheet of white paper now appears yellow.
Sensorimotor theory as it pertains to color experience, is summarized most simply by
understanding the color of an object as the way its appearance varies given relevant
circumstances. Colors are the ways in which objects are disposed to change their appearance as
color-critical conditions change. For example, a plain white sheet of paper in a room lit with
only red light would appear red, as the relevant conditions under which it is viewed are such
that the only light being reflected from the paper are those of a red light. Under this view, the
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plain white paper, is in fact, still white, but it appears to have become a red sheet of paper. On
this view, color is not about lights, but about how surfaces reflect illuminating light. More
specifically, color is the interaction between a surface, and the illuminating light. The color of
the surface is intrinsic, but the surfaces color is reliant on the source of light for its
appearance.
We experience an aspect of color given the particular circumstances in which we are
viewing the object. Take the white sheet of paper out of a room saturated with red light, and
into a room with a normal sunlit kitchen and the paper now appears white depending on where
we are standing in relation to it. In order to investigate the color of the paper more thoroughly
we must pick the paper up, move around it and view it from different angles, each new vantage
gives us a better understanding of the character of the color of the paper.
The color of a surface is its tendency to change appearance in relation to the viewing
conditions it is in. Viewing conditions are not restricted to changes in lighting sources, but are
determined by the environment. Sticking with the white paper example, if the paper is placed on
a dark marble kitchen countertop the paper will now appear to be a more bright white than it
did before, because the nature of the white paper itself is changed by the darker surface in
which it is currently surrounded. The ways in which colors change given color critical
circumstances are defined by the nature of these circumstances. Given a particular light source,
a particular environment, and a normal observer, the way in which a white sheet of paper will
look can be determined objectively.

Color Character as Reflectance Function of a Surface
To explain what is meant by the way surfaces change the spectrum of the incoming
light, and how we perceive the colors, consider one way in which physicists measure surface
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color, or the reflectance function of a surface. The reflectance function of a surface expresses,
as a function, what the reflected light from a surface will be, and allows it to be represented as
a graph that indicates the surface reflectance of any given visible wavelength of light. In short,
it details what proportion of the incident light energy of each wavelength is reflected off a
given surface.
Unlike physicists, with spectrometers that precisely measure light energy at every
wavelength, the human eye relies on photoreceptors that measure light using three cone types,
those that measure the short, medium and long wavelengths. Because of the inherent limits of
the human eyes apparatus for measuring light, the reflectance function of a surface used by
physicists doesn’t do much good for understanding our visual apprehension of color, which can
not recognize light in individual wavelengths (O’Regan, 2010).
In the Sensorimotor approach, the nature of the color of an object is a law that
describes the way surfaces change the spectrum of the incoming light and the experience of
understanding the color of an object is the way its appearance varies given relevant
circumstances. As such, human vision is understood as operating in the same practical way to
determine color as the reflectance function of a surface does, but instead of using the exact
precision of the spectrometer, human vision is restricted to the abilities of the three cone
types. According to O’Regan, by restricting the function to those allowed for the human
photoreceptors abilities (what Philipona and O’Regan call the “biological restriction”), and not
those of a spectrometer, the reflectance of any surface can be given as nine numbers that
define a 3x3 matrix R. In other words, these nine numbers will allow one to calculate, for any
surface reflectance, the way in which the surface will affect the human visual apparatuses three
cone types, or the human photoreceptor absorption function (Philipona and O’Regan, 2006).
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The Biological Reflectance Function
What I have termed the “biological reflectance function,” is composed of the so-called
“LMS signal”, and has two main components, that of the impinging spectrum, and cone
fundamentals (Witzel, 2015). The human visual apparatus contains three types of photoreceptor
cone cells, each with sensitivity to particular sections of the visual spectrum, those sensitive to
what is deemed the long wavelengths, short wavelengths, and those wavelengths that fall in
between (L,M,S). The excitation of the three types of cones (L,M,S), by incoming light hitting the
retina, carries information about the color signal of the visual field. This color signal is referred
to, by O’Regan, as the LMS signal (Witzel, 2015).
Light that actually hits the retina, from any source, is called the impinging light, and the
spectrum of the light hitting the retina is called the 
impinging spectrum
. In the case of the
“biological reflectance function” light is viewed after having reflected off a surface, and
therefore, there are two light spectrums that make up the impinging light, that of the light
source, the illuminant, and the reflected surface, the reflectant. The impinging spectrum is the
linear combination 
of the spectrum of the illuminating source (illuminant) and the spectral
reflectance properties of the surface (reflectant) (Witzel, 2014).
The cone fundamentals on the other hand, are the sensitivities of the human
photoreceptors. In the 2006 paper, 
Color naming, unique hues, and hue cancellation predicted
from singularities in reflection properties, 
Philipona and O’Regan represented photoreceptor
sensitivity by using the 10 degree Stiles and Burch color matching functions (Witzel, 2014).
In order to get the LMS signal that makes up the “biological reflectance function” the
cone fundamentals
, in this case the 10 degree Stiles and Burch color matching functions, must
be applied to the
impinging spectrum
of the linear combination of the illuminant and the
reflectant (Witzel, 2014).
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Calculating the Color Singularity and 3X3 Matrix
According to Philipona and O’Regan (2006) calculating color singularity of surface
reflectance can be broken down into two parts. The first concerns the impinging spectrum and
the relationship of its two component parts, that of the illuminant spectrum, and the spectral
reflectance property of the surface it is illuminating. As discussed earlier, the impinging
spectrum is the wavelength composition of the impinging light (that light that hits the retina)
and is made up of the 
linear composition 
of the illuminant spectrum (illuminant LMS), and the
reflectance signals of the surface (reflectant LMS). This linear composition is used to calculate
the impinging spectrum, and results in a map characterized as accurately linear by O’Regan and
contributors (2015). Because of the linearity of the map of the impinging spectrums, Philipona
and O’Regan found that by transforming the linear compositions of the impinging spectrum to a
3x3 transformation matrix A
a wide range of surface/illumination combinations could be
approximated with nearly perfect accuracy (Witzel, Cinotti, O’Regan, 2015).
The second part of calculating color singularity deals with the behavior of the linear
compositions of the impinging spectrums when transformed into the 3x3 matrix A. The
impinging spectrum can be represented in a “cone-excitation space” a three dimensional space
composed of the 3x3 matrix projections. For a typical impinging spectrum projected into the
cone-excitation space the illuminant and reflectant variations will match up across the space,
but in certain cases the matrix will project a two-dimensional, or one-dimensional subspace
into the cone-excitation space and are called singular matrices. What this means is that certain
impinging spectrums projected into the cone-excitation space have a more simple behavior
than others, and thus, their color is more singular.
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Singularity Index and the World Color Survey
As already covered, in order to determine the nine numbers that define the 3x3 matrix R,
one must have the spectral reflectance property of a surface and its illuminants spectrum (the
impinging spectrum), and the human photoreceptor absorption functions (cone fundamentals).
Philipona and O’Regan tested their theory by calculating two sets of reflectances, one set
composed of natural surfaces (leaves, flower petals, fruit etc.) and the other composed of
artificial surfaces. For this, they chose a color stimulus palette composed of 1600 glossy surface
Munsell chips as taken from the University of Joensuu (Parkkinen, 1989). For my purposes it is
only necessary to discuss the artificial set of reflectances.
By applying the cone fundamentals of the
10-deg Stiles and Burch color matching
function
to the impinging spectrum, and then to the Munsell Chip set, Philipona and O’Regan
were able to create what they refer to as a singularity index, that is to say an index of how
singular examples are of a given color, or hue (O’Regan, 2011). This singularity index based on
the 1600 Munsell chips shows that the biologically restricted surface reflectance function
points to six distinctly singular Munsell chips, those of the powerfully singular red and yellow
chips, and those of the less singular blue, green, magenta and cyan chips (O’Regan, 2011
Supplemental/Unpublished Chapters). What distinguishes these six peaks of singularity is that
the function has a more simple behavior than the rest of the functions of the graph (O’Regan
2010).
Interestingly, the Munsell chip stimulus palette used by Philipona and O’Regan to test
their biologically restricted surface reflectance idea is the same stimulus palette used in the
1970’s by two anthropologists from the University of California at Berkeley in what is now called
the “World Color Survey.” The World Color Survey sought to test the hypothesis that there
existed universal constraints across languages in regards to color naming, and that there was a
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partially fixed evolutionary progression of color language in which languages gain color terms
over time (Kay, 2009). The survey collected the data of the color names of over 110 languages,
by showing speakers of each language the Munsell chip stimulus palette and asking them to
identify those colors that best represented each of the most basic colors of their language. The
focal, or most basic, colors are represented on the munsell chip graph by four distinct peaks,
with each peak listing the colored munsell chip that best represents the most basic colors.
Most surprising perhaps is that each peak, constituted of each culture's choice for most basic
color representation, are all uniformly chosen within one or two Munsell chips. For example the
surprisingly singular basic color of “red” was almost unanimously represented by one munsell
chip in particular, that of “G1.”
Both the World Color Survey and O’Regan and Philipona’s singularity index share a
striking resemblance, with the latter's representation of the most singular colors falling within
a couple Munsell chips of the World Color Survey. O’Regan suggests that the precision of the
agreement of the simpler hues of the singularity index and the systematic way that “focal”
colors were assigned names in the World Color Survey is an indication of a biological
correspondence between the most simple colors (red, yellow) and our tendency to assign names
to them. One reason O’Regan proposes that the more simple hues have a tendency to be given
names is that perhaps their simple behavior in regards to illuminating light makes them more
conspicuous than the other colors, and therefore more likely to be engaged across cultures
(O’Regan, 2010).

Sensorimotor Theory and the Explanatory Gap
While the sensorimotor theory of color places color as existing objectively in the world,
there is still an aspect of it that is experiential, namely the part that depends on the experience
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of color. The experience of color is the perceived quality of the sensory experience, or as
O’Regan defines it, the “feel”. To most philosophers this “perceived quality” is more often
referred to as the qualia of the experience, the ineffable “what it’s like” quality. The
sensorimotor theory, while accepting qualia, rejects the idea of qualia being ineffable. The
sensorimotor theory does not support the idea that “feel” is generated in the brain, because
feel is a way of interacting with the environment. Specifically, feeling is a skillful use of the
sensorimotor contingencies to interact with the world.
According to sensorimotor color theory we all experience the same information coming
into our visual apparatus, but given differences between human visual apparatuses our
experience of that information will be different. But, in theory if we know the information
coming in, in this case the spectral reflectance of the surface, and the exact biological
limitations of the individual's visual apparatus (for example if they were colorblind, what
wavelengths they could process and what wavelengths they could not) we can plot a singularity
index for the individual akin to the one that O’Regan and Philipona plotted for the biological
reflectance function.
Having a singularity index for the individual provides us with a possible way of
understanding what the individual may be perceiving, it still doesn’t explain the “feel” of
experiencing a color such as red. According to O’Regan the experience of the “feel” of red has
three possible parts, that of cognitive states, behavioral reactions, and physiological impulses.
Cognitive states are those of mental association of the color red with previously experienced
objects, knowledge of color relations, thoughts provoked by the redness of the object (e.g.
linguistic associations) etc. Behavioral reactions are secondary aspects of the feel of an
experience, and they include automatic reactions, such as pressing the gas at a green light.
Physiological impulses are those physical states changed by the experience.
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These elements of seeing the color red, O’Regan admits, are not exactly what is
described when talking about the qualia of an experience. The above components of seeing red,
are more appropriately described as components of what happens upon seeing red, and are
more appropriately defined as being caused by the experience of seeing red. But, O’Regan
argues, even if the actual experience of red appears ineffable, and therefore appears to lack
ability to describe, within each modality we can compare and structure experiences, and make
comparisons of comparisons and observe that some colors are more alike than others, and
some colors are more different than others (O'Regan,"How to Build a Robot That Feels”). O’Regan
argues that a way to make these comparisons and observations is to build something like the
psychological colour solid which attempts to structure the “feel” or quality of color on a
multidimensional scale (Clark, 1993 pg. 120-121). While psychological color solids like the one’s
described by Clark are part of accounts of a fully internalized and neurally "interpreted"
psychological color solid, O’Regan is arguing to repurpose the actual color solids themselves as
a means for computation of color experience existing only as an 
external 
method for
categorizing color “feel.”
Under traditional models of consciousness all of this would do little to alleviate the
ineffability of qualia, but under sensorimotor theory, a careful analysis of all the constituent
parts of the experience of the color red as outlined above, can describe “what it is like” for an
individual to see the color red.

Problems of the biological reflectance function and qualia
As stated above, O’Regan argues that the singularity index, based on a biological
reflectance function, and its correspondence to the world color survey is an indication of a
biological approach to color naming. Namely, a process based on the biological singularity, or
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asymmetry, of a color makes that color more simple to apprehend, and this simplicity leads,
naturally, to our species naming them. In order for O’Regan’s biological process of color naming
to make sense though, it would seem to require some sort of logical process to color naming,
meaning all colors sufficiently red-like, and not green-like, will be categorized as like colors. I
argue that O’Regan’s innate (as he terms it, biological) color discrimination approach to color
naming is at odds with his argument that the “feel” of color is not generated in the brain. I
argue this for two reasons; first if color naming followed natural biological processes, meaning
color naming is based on a biological ability to color discriminate and is therefore innate, it
would seem to imply that all color category systems would include like colors with like-colors.
In regards to color naming following a natural biological process, what I mean by this is
that O’Regan argues that the “feel” of a color, and it’s singularity are ultimately what contribute
to that color being given a name, so therefore, the “feel” of red (determined through the careful
analysis of the constituent parts of the “feel” of the color) is what leads red to be named its
corresponding color name across language platforms.
But, if there are six main “singular” colors that humans apprehend most easily, and color
naming tendencies are based on this ease of apprehension, this would seem to imply that the
sufficiently simple enough color language would start off with at most six color terms (based on
the examples in the singularity index), with each encompassing all sufficiently “like” colors.
What this means is that the singularity of “red” would lead to all adequately “red” colors to be
included under the “red” color term. I argue this because O’Regan argues that the “feel” of a
color is not generated in the head, but derives from objective “feel” that exists in the world. If
this were the case, then it should be clear to everyone with the same visual apparatus that dark
red is closer to red, than it is to bright yellow.
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If this were true though, and colors could be determined purely by “feel” it is not readily
apparent why some cultures create color category systems that 
do not
include like colors with
like colors. For instance, the Himba people of Namibia have a color categorization system that is
limited to five terms, and does not focus exclusively on like-colors.
The Himba color categorization system raises many questions for O’Regans innate “feel”
based color discrimination theory. For instance, the term “Serandu” is relatively like-color based,
within the color term is included some reds, purples and pinks. If we look at “Zoozu” though, it
includes black, all dark shades of all colors, plus many none dark greens, blues, purples, and even
some very light shades of purple and pink. Juxtaposing “Vapa” and “Borou” we see overlapping
of like-colors also, with “Vapa” being white and many other light shades of various colors, and
“Borou” being a range of yellows, greens, blues, purples, near browns, and almost pinks. If we
look at the colors that overlap between them, we see many shades of blue, green and purple
that are nearly identical in appearance, but are categorized differently. Interesting too, is that
regardless of how different the colors within a color category appear to be to speakers of other
languages, to the Himba a dark green and a light pink within a certain category are considered
equally “focal” examples of that color. The overlap can be seen in all colors in the Himba system
(Roberson, Debi, Jules Davidoff, Ian R.l. Davies, and Laura R. Shapiro, 2005). This overlap is
puzzling from the perspective of O’Regan’s “feel” based discrimination theory, as a light shade
of pink, a dark shade of green, and a bright turquoise all share one color term. Even if one were
to accept that there are basic universal color categories (red, yellow, green, blue, magenta, and
cyan) and that the surrounding colors name tendencies were distorted by education, culture, or
whatever, this would be problematic for the “feel” based nature of the discrimination system as
even with this distorted color field, even though a bright pink and a bright blue are included
under the same color term, it should be readily apparent how different these two colors appear.
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This is not what is seen when color differentiation within color terms is studied. In fact,
the opposite appears to be true. Colors that are categorized differently are apprehended by
subjects as different colors, no matter how closely their hues resemble one another, and colors
that are categorized under the same term are apprehended as appearing to be the same color.
Subjects with different color category systems have been shown to be able to discriminate
within their own color terms if the actual color difference is large enough, but the ability to
differentiate is no better than an English speaker telling the difference between two close
shades of green. That is to say, it may take a considerable amount of time for them to
discriminate the color difference if at all. The most profound difference in discrimination is
between different color terms that have colors that closely resemble each other.
For example, in Russian there is no generic color term for blue. Blue, as English speakers
know it is split into two separate colors, siniy (dark blue) and goluboy (lighter blue) in the
Russian color language. When tested against native English speakers in a variety of
discrimination tests between siniy and goluboy it was found that native Russian speakers had
an advantage in discrimination between the two colors, especially when the colors were very
close hues to one another, but were categorized differently in Russian (Winawer, J., N. Witthoft,
M. C. Frank, L. Wu, A. R. Wade, and L. Boroditsky, 2007).
Likewise, individuals of the Himba tribe were tested for color discrimination between and
within color categories and it was found that the color categories themselves are what
determined an individual's ability to discriminate colors, not a biological ability to discriminate.
While obviously there is a biological ability to discriminate between colors, it made little
difference in a subject's abilities to actually tell colors apart. Himba subjects were tested for
color discrimination in two tests. One test used shades of color that were equally spaced in
Munsell system perceptual metric (that is to say, a transition of color shades were shown, for
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example, on one side basic green that slowly transitioned until it became blue at the other
side), and subjects were asked to distinguish between the color categories. Within this test
speakers of English would judge this to be a smooth transition between colors with no space
between color shades. The Himba on the other hand viewed it to be an uneven spacing between
Munsell cells, and clearly delineating between the various color categories of their language
instead of viewing it as a transition between colors (Roberson, 2005; Goldstein, 2009). In
another test two separate circular arrangements of color tiles were shown to test subjects. One
arrangement contained shades that were all considered to be very close shades of green, close
enough that most people could not tell them apart, but in the Himba color system one of these
close shades of green belonged to another color category. The other arrangement contained
one shade of easily discriminable blue, while the rest of the tiles were a shade of green, but in
the Himba language all of these colors were part of one color category. For the Himba test
subjects the first test containing all “like” colors was an easy task to pick the color tile that did
not belong even though the color tiles all appeared to be the same color green to English
speakers, while picking out the color that didn’t belong in the second arrangement of color tiles
proved much more difficult. In some cases even after long periods of time the Himba test
subjects could not pick out the color that did not belong (Regier and Kay, 2009).

Color Categories and Color Discrimination
It is important to point out that O’Regan is making the claim that the abilities of our
visual apparatus to discriminate colors is what leads to color categorization systems. I feel this
is important to make clear, at this point, as O’Regan is not claiming his biological color naming
system is one that is naturally based on an innate system of color categorization, as that would
require a representational mental “prototype.” O’Regan is claiming that we have a natural ability
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to discriminate the six naturally “simple,” or singular, colors of red, yellow, green, blue, magenta,
and cyan, exactly because of their singularity. This means that we have a natural ability to pick
out “basic” red as being a distinct color easier than any other color, and because we can easily
pick it out, we have a natural tendency to assign it a name. In this way, O’Regan implies that
color naming is an issue of memory, as colors are there in the world. Our biological systems
merely give us the ability to discriminate some colors easier than others, as these colors have
sensorimotor contingencies that are easier to grasp than others.
But 
it is arguable if an account of the discriminations made by the visual system can
account for the structural relations between different color experiences. As such Iargue that if
color categorization systems do come about because of a natural ability to color discriminate
those six color terms, then all sufficiently like colors should be categorized with their like colors
as in the sensorimotor approach to color there is no mental representation of color, and no
color qualia. If it is not the case that all like colors are categorized under that same colors then
there is no accounting for exactly what color viewers are seeing, or why they are unable to
discriminate colors that are so distinct to other viewers. The visual system of the Himba and an
English speaker are the same, and as such, we have the abilities to see the same colors and
therefore we should be able to discriminate between the same colors. Thus, if O’Regan’s
sensorimotor approach to color perception and color naming is correct it demands a universal
color language, but as outlined earlier, this is not the case.

Analysis
O’Regan’s sensorimotor approach to color makes clear that apprehension of different
colors is a matter of mastery of pertinent sensorimotor contingencies, and memory. As such,
the first colors to be understood would be those that have the most simple sensorimotor laws
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to master. According to the work of Philipona and O’Regan (2006) the colors with the most
simple sensorimotor contingencies are those that are considered the most singular on the
singularity index (red, yellow, green, blue, magenta, and cyan) and that all other colors would be
described as one of those six categories until their sensorimotor laws are understood. For
instance, a color such as brick red, would appear to be just red, or perhaps “reddish” until their
sensorimotor laws are understood, but once they are understood they would be clearly
apprehended as a distinct color, that of brick red. In this way, colors are understood based on
their relation, or likeness, to the original “singular” colors. I contend that this is exactly where
the sensorimotor approach runs into a problem. If colors were apprehended in a gradual
acquisition of new colors as the sensorimotor approach implies, there should one be a universal
color language across all cultures, but as has already been shown, this is not the case.
I agree with the 2006 Philipona and O’Regan paper 
Color Naming, Unique Hues, and Hue
Cancellation Predicted from Singularities in Reflection Properties
when it shows that some
colors are easier to apprehend than others based on their singularity corresponding to more
simple sensorimotor contingencies, but I believe this 
ease of apprehension 
is not an indication
of how color categories are formed, and is perhaps merely coincidental to the way that colors
have been named and categorized.

Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to refute Kevin O’Regan’s claim that the “biological
reflectance function” and its notion of “simple” colors naturally lead to a biologically consistent
standard for species wide color naming. Although the simplicity of these colors may allow for
easier apprehension, the notion that color simplicity will naturally lead to a consistent standard
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for the naming of basic color hues across a species is inconsistent with the idea of objective
colors in the way that he portrays it. While it fixes many of the traditional explanatory issues
surrounding color perception, it opens up new explanatory issues surrounding color. In
response, I argue that more emphasis must be put on the place of socio/cultural judgements
and habits in the sensorimotor approach to color perception. In contrast to O’Regans assertion
that culture follows natural tendencies to name certain colors, I argue that color naming
follows socio-cultural considerations for color naming regardless of objectivity of color
experience.
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